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ABSTRACT 
The EU broiler Directive came into force in the UK in June 2010 with the aim of setting new 
minimum standards, monitoring broiler welfare and addressing any welfare problems. A survey 
questionnaire was used to elicit information from a stratified sample of citizens in England and 
Wales regarding their willingness to pay for the provisions of the Directive, as an estimate of the 
consumer surplus associated with the legislation. We also explore the usefulness of Prelec’s 
(2004) Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) in promoting respondents’ truthful reporting. A median 
willingness to pay of £21.5 per household per year (corrected for sample bias and possible ‘yea 
saying’) was estimated from 665 responses. This provides an estimated benefit of the legislation 
to citizens of over £503 million/yr, equivalent to 5.3% of current consumer expenditure on 
chicken. This compares to an estimated £22 million per annum cost of producers’ compliance 
and government enforcement associated with the legislation. No statistically significant 
differences in responses between respondents that did and did not have a BTS incentive to 
answer questions truthfully were found, which might reflect apparently truthful answers in this 
case, an insufficiently strong financial incentive or a weakened effect due to an element of 
disbelief in the BTS amongst the sample. The analysis suggests that the benefits of the broiler 
Directive to citizens greatly outweigh the additional costs to producers, making a case for the 
legislation to be retained.  
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The benefits of farm animal welfare legislation: the case of the EU broiler 
directive and truthful reporting 
1. Introduction 
Legislation has been a major policy instrument for the protection of animal welfare in Europe with 
many European Union (EU) regulations and directives implemented in the last 20 years (Bennett 
and Appleby, 2011; European Commission, 2016). In 2007 new EU rules were agreed (Council 
Directive 2007/43/EC) for protecting the welfare of broiler chickens (European Commission, 
2007). The broiler Directive came into force in the United Kingdom (UK) on 30 June 2010. When 
such legislation is introduced there is an expectation that the benefits of that legislation will be 
greater than the costs. Expected costs include costs to government, for administration, monitoring 
and enforcement, as well as compliance costs for producers and broader industry and national costs 
associated with impacts on competitiveness, international trade and economic output. Expected 
benefits of such legislation are generally non-monetary, but include consumer perceptions of 
enhanced chicken meat quality and enhancement of consumer and citizens levels of satisfaction 
from knowing that the welfare of broiler chickens is better protected in the food production process 
(see Mayfield et al., 2007 in relation to consumer attitudes to animal welfare in Europe). Indeed, 
a UK government ex ante Impact Assessment (IA) published in 2010 (Defra, 2010) concluded that 
while the broiler Directive would lead to some costs to producers, this would be more than off-set 
by non-market benefits to consumers, in the form of higher broiler welfare, for which many would 
be willing to pay. We test the hypothesis that citizens have an additional willingness to pay (WTP) 
for the broiler Directive beyond any price increase as a result of increased costs of production due 
to the legislation and assess the scale of such benefits by means of an ex post WTP survey of 
citizens. Since the perceived costs of improving animal welfare can deter legislation it is important 
to estimate the benefits of legislation to better inform policy. In addition, as a methodological 
contribution, we explore the usefulness of Prelec’s (2004) Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) which is 
designed to reduce respondents’ misreporting (i.e. help ensure ‘truthful’ reporting) in surveys.  
 
Theoretically, the WTP we estimate using the CV method is a Hicksian consumer surplus measure 
(see Mitchell and Carson, 1989 p25) which can be interpreted as a respondent’s maximum WTP 
for the broiler legislation and its provisions (considered, at least in part, as a public good, because 




Our WTP estimate measures both use and non-use value and, as noted by Zhao and Kling (2004), 
is defensible theoretically as a welfare measure that can be directly applied to cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Section 2 covers the background of WTP in the area of animal health and welfare and associated 
legislation along with a description of the broiler Directive and its implementation in the United 
Kingdom. Section 3 outlines the WTP survey whilst Section 4 covers the analytical methods. 




WTP applied to animal health and welfare 
Although widely used in other areas, stated preference valuation methods have perhaps been less 
widely applied to animal welfare. Bennett et al. (2011) provide a review and critique of valuation 
studies applied to animal welfare. Lagerkvist and Hess (2011) identify 24 stated preference 
studies of people’s WTP in relation to animal welfare, yielding 106 WTP estimates, in their 
meta-analysis.  Approximately half of these are contingent valuation studies and half use a 
choice experiment approach (with one other using an experimental auction method). 
Additionally, Clark et al. (2016) observed just 17 WTP studies out of some 80 studies included 
in their systematic review of public attitudes, perceptions and behaviours towards animal welfare 
concerns arising from livestock production diseases.  
 
A common feature of these studies is that they elicit WTP from citizens regarding specific 
changes in husbandry or other practices to improve welfare, although Bennett et al. (2012) 
present a method for the economic valuation of animal welfare benefits more generally using a 
single welfare score. WTP values can be used as estimates of the likely magnitude of the benefits 
that citizens obtain from each of these animal husbandry or other measures. It is clear from a 
number of the studies reviewed that consumers value animal welfare not only for ethical reasons 
but also in some cases because they believe that products from animals with higher welfare are 
of higher quality in terms of taste, nutrition and safety and better for the environment (despite 





The broiler Directive and its implementation in the UK 
While one of the purposes of the broiler Directive is to promote more universal achievement of 
minimum animal welfare standards across EU members states (MS), a number of 
implementation options are permitted, including variation in the maximum stocking density 
limits that can be applied in each MS. In the UK producers have been permitted to choose from 
among two stocking density maxima:  
i) stocking up to 33kg live weight per m2 is permitted if specific standards are met for drinkers, 
feeding, litter, ventilation and heating, noise, light, inspections, cleaning, record keeping, training 
and surgical interventions.  
ii) stocking beyond 33kg per m2 up to 38kg/m2 is permitted if an additional set of standards are 
met (the Annex II requirements). These include notification and documentation requirements, 
plus further controls on environmental parameters in broiler housing. 
 
In addition, the Directive requires the collection of data from farms on cumulative daily 
mortality (CDM) and data from slaughterhouses for eight post-mortem measures of body 
condition (collectively known as the ‘trigger conditions’) to help identify poor welfare on 
farms. These data, which relate to each batch of birds per farm sent to slaughter, are used 
by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) to 
identify farms which may require problem notification and/or on-site inspection. The post-
mortem body condition measures for which data are collected are: 1) ascites/oedema, 2) 
cellulitis and dermatitis, 3) dead on arrival, 4) emaciation, 5) joint lesions/arthritis, 6) 
septicaemia/respiratory problems, 7) total carcase rejections and 8) foot pad dermatitis 
score. Evaluation of these data involves two processes: 
Process 1: An alert (to APHA) is triggered if the incidence of any of the individual post-
mortem conditions is exceptionally high in any batch (defined as greater than six standard 
deviations above the mean); 
Process 2: An alert is triggered if the CDM is unusually high (defined as greater than three 
standard deviations above the mean) and, additionally, the level of three or more of the 
post-mortem conditions is high (defined as above the mean). 
 




means of a ‘trigger report’. APHA and FSA have inspection regimes and data handling 
systems to communicate information relating to poor welfare between the slaughterhouse 
and the producer. Investigative action will be taken by APHA Veterinary Officers, and this 
may include requesting a written action plan to remedy the problem from producers and/or 
a visit to the production site. APHA may, in addition, carry out a number of random 
welfare inspections. 
 
Thus, under the broiler Directive, new broiler production standards are set and enforced 
through a system which continuously monitors key welfare indicators, linked to an 
intervention process to deal with problems should they occur. In 2013/14 the percentage of 
batches sent for slaughter in GB which exceeded Trigger 1 levels varied from less than 
0.2% for joint and arthritis problems to 1.8% for foot pad dermatitis (Food Standards 
Agency, personal communication). 
 
3. The Survey 
Questionnaire design and survey administration 
A questionnaire was designed which contained an introduction explaining the nature of the 
survey and its purpose, followed by questions to respondents with regards to their: 
1. Personal characteristics (sample stratification variables); 
2. Current consumption of chicken meat; 
3. Attitudes towards farmed-animal welfare; 
4. WTP for farmed-animal welfare improvements in general; 
5. Attitudes towards the broiler Directive; 
6. WTP for the Directive and debriefing questions to explain respondents’ WTP responses; 
7. Socio-demographic characteristics (non-stratification variables). 
 
A specimen copy of the questionnaire can be found in the online Appendix, available at the 
publisher’s website. Two versions of the questionnaire were designed in relation to those who did, 
and did not, consume chicken. Chicken consumers were asked how much extra they would be 
willing to pay for the Directive in the form of a premium on the price of the conventionally reared 




additional sum on their income tax. The survey was carried out by means of a web-based 
questionnaire hosted by the commercial research support company Qualtrics 
(http://www.qualtrics.com). The questionnaire was sent to a Qualtrics-secured panel of the general 
public in England and Wales. A stratification procedure was applied during recruitment of survey 
participants to ensure that the sample was broadly representative of populations in England and 
Wales. This required set proportions across geographic area, age and income, based on population 
distributions from data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS).2 Respondents were screened 
to ensure that they were the primary, or regular, purchaser of food for their household. 
 
Respondent WTP was elicited using a contingent valuation (CV) payment card with a discrete 
dichotomous choice format with multiple increasing values akin to a ‘bidding game’ (see, for 
example, Heinzen and Bridges, 2008, who compare four different CV elicitation methods).   The 
payment card method is regarded as efficient, robust and reliable (see, for example, Bateman, et 
al, 2002; Pearce and Ozdemiroglu, 2002), and was considered the most appropriate WTP 
elicitation method for our purposes. We sought people’s holistic WTP for a single specified 
legislative intervention rather than valuation of different attributes of the legislation where a choice 
experiment approach would have been more appropriate. Our hypothesis was that people would 
have a willingness to pay in addition to current market prices of chicken meat to retain the 
legislation up to the point where their consumer surplus is zero. After reminding respondents that 
they have a limited household budget and that additional money spent on supporting the chicken 
legislation may mean that they have less money to spend on other things, respondents were 
presented with a range of seven bids, of ascending value, from ‘5 pence per week extra’ to ‘more 
than £4 per week extra’. These bids were expressed as an additional amount that respondents would 
pay per week, either in the form of an increase in the price of chicken meat, or taxation for those 
relative few who did not consume chicken3. The range of amounts chosen was based on findings 
                                                          
2 Despite this, some over-recruitment was found in certain socio-demographic groups requiring adjustment 
described later in the Results section. The questionnaire was pre-tested by the research team on a small number of 
consumers, and then formally piloted by Qualtrics using a panel of 50 consumers. The survey was officially 
launched on 30 September 2014 and was closed on 8 October 2014, by which time 665 usable responses had been 
received. In order to eliminate the possibility of partially completed questionnaires, respondents were required to 
complete all questions before they could file their return. 
3 A zero amount was not presented to respondents at this point because (i) respondents could answer ‘No’ to all 




of pre-testing of the questionnaire and was later confirmed to be appropriate in the pilot. 
Respondents were asked to tick ‘Yes’ if they would be willing to pay each amount or ‘No’ if they 
would not. Respondents were asked to state their WTP to support the Directive and its associated 
provisions, taken as a whole. Respondents were also asked to indicate how they thought other 
people would respond to the WTP questions. 
 
Misreporting and the Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) 
Prelec (2004) proposed the BTS as a general mechanism to encourage ‘truth telling’ in a variety 
of contexts, from answering simple ‘yes or no’ questions to more complex WTP studies. There 
has been growing recognition of the BTS as a potential incentive mechanism for accurate reporting 
across a range of survey types (e.g. John et al, 2012; Weaver and Prelec, 2013). Incentives to 
accurate reporting may be worth using where respondents believe (perhaps falsely) that there may 
be real consequences induced by the findings of a survey and so there is the potential for the 
hypothetical survey to be ‘incentive incompatible’ (i.e. for respondents to misreport their true 
preferences; see Hurwicz, 1972 p.320), and also where reporting accurately is costly in terms of 
time or cognitive effort or where respondents have little incentive to answer carefully and honestly. 
 
The aim of the BTS approach is to elicit truthful (i.e. honest and carefully considered) subjective 
data in situations where the objective truth is unknowable. The method uses an information 
scoring system that is thought to elicit truthful answers from a sample of rational expected-value-
maximizing respondents (Prelec, 2004). It has been claimed that the approach can eliminate bias 
common in contingent valuation studies when applied to responses pertaining to the respondent’s 
contribution to a public good (Weaver and Prelec, 2013). The BTS can be described as follows. 
People are asked a question (e.g. would you be prepared to pay an additional amount for 
legislation x?). Additionally, they are asked to estimate what proportion of people (in general) 
they think would give a particular response. Both these responses contribute to a formula made 
known to the respondent, which integrates their responses with the responses of other individuals 
asked the same questions. The BTS theorem contends that if individuals provide personally 
truthful answers then expected scores are maximized. Respondents are then incentivised (usually 
                                                          
asked respondents whether they would be likely to be willing to pay something for the legislation on a five-point 




monetarily) to get a higher score. The precise nature of the formula is shown in the online 
Appendix, available at the publisher’s website. The formula assigns high scores to respondents’ 
personal answers that are more common across the sample than collectively predicted by all 
respondents when asked how they think others would respond (i.e. what proportion of people 
generally would give a particular response). For example, an answer shared by 10% of all 
respondents compared to a prediction of 5% would be surprisingly common and receive a high 
score. The assumption is that people tend to believe that the proportion of responses that 
correspond to their own response will be higher than the mean proportional responses elicited 
from the whole sample. By rewarding people for giving ‘surprisingly common’ responses truth 
telling is thus encouraged. 
 
Half of the respondents were given a Bayesian Truth Serum Incentive (BTSI) statement to see if 
it had an impact on their reporting (see Weaver and Prelec, 2013 for other examples of such 
statements). The BTSI statement read: “Please note that one person will be chosen at random in a 
prize draw to receive up to £100. The exact amount of the prize will be determined by the winner’s 
Truth Score (the higher the score the higher the prize amount). The Truth Score is a measure 
recently developed and published in the academic journal Science 
(http://nel.mit.edu/pdf/17BayesianTruthSerumcopy.pdf). Even though only you know how 
truthful your answers are, people who consider the questions carefully, answer honestly and take 
care to avoid mistakes score higher on the Truth Score and provide more reliable information for 
the survey.” For the BTS to work, respondents are not required to understand the mathematics of 
the scoring nor the theory behind the BTS. However, they must believe that the method rewards 
truth telling on average. If the BTSI had an impact, this should manifest itself as a difference in 
the responses of incentivised vs non-incentivised individuals. 
 
4. Estimation and inference 
In addition to descriptive statistics, the principle method used within the study to estimate WTP 
is a Bayesian Interval Regression model specified under two different assumptions concerning 
the error distribution, i.e. the log-Normal and the Normal. 
 









ln (𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖) = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝐵𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑖 + 𝑐𝑍𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖   (2) 
 
where  
𝐵𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑆𝑇𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
𝑍𝑖  𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖 
𝑒𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝜎
2. 
 
The models were estimated with and without b= 0 imposed, but we only present the full models 
below (in Table 4 which also outlines the covariates used) since all other coefficients were 
virtually the same with and without this restriction. The interval regression assumes that in either 
case the error is normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance. Interval regression is 
used to model dependent variables that have interval censoring. That is, each observation is 
known to lie within a range, but is potentially unobserved within that range. The upper and lower 
ranges can be bounded or unbounded, and if some of the values of some dependent variables are 
known exactly, then they can be treated as exact. An option to run interval regressions now exists 
for many packages including SAS, R, Gretl, and Stata.  A full description of the interval model 
can be found in Stewart (1983). This model is the same whether it is estimated using a Classical 
or Bayesian approach. The former would map the likelihood function as expressed in Stewart 
(1983) and the latter can map the posterior (proportional to the likelihood multiplied by a weak 
prior) using any number of MCMC (Markov chain Monte Carlo) algorithms. The MCMC 
algorithms used here were coded from first principles in the GAUSS mathematical and statistical 
system software. Since WTP is only observed as an interval with an upper and lower bound (l.u), 
the WTP or lnWTP is treated as a latent variable with a conditional mean and variance as in the 
regressions above. Although the Bayesian model was used here with non-informative priors, the 
results will be virtually identical to those obtained using a Classical approach (Stewart, 1983). 
The log-Normal model is preferred in this case, given that the distribution of WTP estimates (as 
averages of the intervals) are clearly of a log-Normal type. However, as will be shown, the key 





The impact of the BTSI on responses was examined in two ways. First, a test was applied to see 
whether the BTS scores of the incentivised group differed from the non-incentivised group. 
Then, the WTP distributions were examined to see if they were different across the two 
populations using an interval regression model with a BTSI dummy variable. The significance of 
this dummy variable would indicate whether incentivising participants had an impact on 
respondents’ behaviour. In conducting this component normally distributed WTPs and log-





Table 1 contains a summary of descriptive statistics for the sample of 665 responses. The sample 
contained 55% males and 45% females, with respondents living in households of 2.2 people on 
average, of whom 0.4 were under 16 years of age. Average household income was £33,500. Fifty-
nine percent of respondents reported living in rural settings, i.e. in either villages or provincial 
towns, with 41% stating that they lived in urban areas. Nearly 16% of respondents reported being 
members of an organisation concerned with the welfare of animals such as the RSPCA or RSPB4.  
 
Table 1 –Descriptive statistics for the survey sample 
Description Value(s) 
Total sample size 665 
Gender Male (55%); Female (45%) 
Age distribution (by group) <40 (26.8%); 40-59 (32.6%) 60+ (40.6%) 
Average household size (persons) 2.2 
Average number of children in households <16 years 0.4 
Average household income (£ p.a.) 33,500 
                                                          
4 This percentage would appear relatively high but it is likely that respondents interpreted this question quite 
widely including a range of organisations and relatively lax definitions of what constitutes membership. This 




Percentage of rural residents 59% 
Percent of respondents who are members of an 
organisation concerned with the welfare of animals 
16% 
Percentage of respondents who were vegetarians 2.5% 
Percentage of respondents who consumed chicken 94.9% 
Consumption of meals (from all sources) containing 
chicken (number of meals / week) 
1-2 (51.5%); 3-7 (43.2%); 7+ (5.3%) 
Weekly spend on chicken (all sources) (£ /week / 
household) 
0-£4.99 (37%); £5-£14.99 (54.5%); £15+ 
(8.5%) 




Almost 95% of respondents reported being consumers of chicken. Just under half of those who did 
not consume chicken stated their reason as being vegetarianism. Respondents consuming chicken 
reported eating an average of 3.05 meals per week containing chicken (mode 1-2; includes 
takeaways and meals out), with a range from one to 15. Respondents reported spending a modal 
value of £5-£10 per week (mean £7.8) on chicken purchases for their household, excluding 
takeaway meals and meals eaten outside the home (respondents were asked to select from 
categories for their response, which ranged from zero to more than £20 per week). Chicken from 
conventional production systems was by far the most common purchase, with free-range chicken 
regularly purchased by just 23% of the sample. Fifty-six percent of the sample reported purchasing 
free-range chicken meat only occasionally and 21% never purchased it. 
 
Respondents were asked to rank their concern for farmed animals against a number of other widely 
held concerns, such as those in relation to the environment. Chicken eaters are most concerned 
about food safety, with animal welfare concerns near to last. Non-chicken eaters place food safety 
concerns last, but, again, animal welfare concerns are low in the order of priorities (‘healthy diet’ 
was ranked first). Respondents were asked to rank their level of concern for the welfare of broiler 
chickens reared in the UK on a scale of 0-10, where 0 = not concerned at all and 10 = very 




than non-chicken eaters, i.e. 8.6 compared to 8.2. There were significant age differences in ranking 
of concern, with older respondents ranking concern more highly (F=3.53, p=0.0147). 
 
WTP elicitation 
Respondents were asked to indicate the maximum sum that they would be willing to pay per 
week as an additional amount on the cost of their chicken meat purchases (or, in the case of non-
chicken eaters, as an increase in taxation) to support the broiler legislation. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of WTP responses. Those classified as zero in Figure 1 are those who responded 
‘No’ to the lowest WTP amount offered to them (5p per week extra) and may therefore include 
those with a non-zero but low (i.e. less than 5p) WTP. In the estimation of WTP, in the case of 
the unlogged data, the latent variables for those saying they would not pay the smallest possible 
amount (5p) are truncated above by the smallest possible values in the survey (5p), and this 
allows potentially negative WTPs. For the logged version, the logged WTP is truncated above 
the log of the smallest possible value, except by construction the latent WTPs will (when being 
anti-logged i.e. taking the exponential of the log WTP) imply positive though negligible WTPs. 
 
Respondents were asked a number of debriefing questions to explore the reasons for their stated 
WTP, and test the rationality of responses. These questions presented a number of propositional 
statements and respondents had to express their level of agreement with each, using an 11-point 
scale where 0 = ’does not reflect my views at all’ and 10 = ‘reflects my views completely’ (see 
Table 2). Respondents were first asked to indicate whether they understood the information 
provided in the questionnaire about the broiler legislation. The mean sample rank score was 8.7, 
indicating a high level of agreement. When asked whether they understood the WTP question (for 
both payment vehicles), the great majority of respondents indicated that they did (mean score 8.9). 
 







Respondents generally believed that the welfare of chickens reared for meat needed to be improved 
and also expressed a belief that the Directive itself would act to improve the welfare of chickens 
reared for meat. It is interesting to note that although the Directive was introduced in 2010 (the 
study outlined here was part of an ex-post appraisal of the legislation) respondents were generally 
not aware of the Directive (for example, all focus group participants were found to be unaware of 
the legislation). There was a relatively high level of agreement by respondents that their WTP 
values reflected their concerns about the welfare of broiler chickens. Overall, respondents tended 
to agree with the statement that they should not have to pay more to improve chicken welfare. As 
might be expected, respondents who did not eat chicken were less likely to agree with the 
statement. There was no significant difference on this measure between those who regularly 
purchased free-range chicken and those who did not, even though there was a significant difference 
in WTP between these groups (F=13.28, p<0.0001), with regular purchasers willing to pay 
£0.9/week more than those who never purchased. Perhaps surprisingly, those respondents that 
most strongly expressed the view that they should not have to pay more (scores of 9 and 10) did 
not have a significantly lower WTP (t=-0.04, p=0.9680). Finally, most of the respondents 
(212/59% scored between 6 and 10) who received the questionnaire version with the BTSI agreed 
with the statement that they believed the information provided to them about the truth score (12% 
scored 5 suggesting they neither believed nor did not believe the information and 14% scored 





















Table 2.  Responses to WTP debriefing questions, where average rank score expresses degree of 
agreement with propositional statements on a scale of zero to 10. 
 
Propositional statements Rank scorea 
(0–10) 
 
I understood the information provided to me 
about the legislation 
8.74  
I understood the willingness to pay questions 8.94  
The welfare of chickens reared for meat needs 
improving 
8.36  
The legislation will improve the welfare of 
chickens reared for meat 
8.05  
My WTP reflects my concern about chicken 
welfare 
7.57  
I should not have to pay more to improve chicken 
welfare 
6.63  
I believed the information provided about the 
Truth Score 
       6.23  
a Note: A rank score of 0 = ‘does not reflect my views at all’ and a rank of 10 = ‘reflects my views completely’. 
 
Table 3 shows the numbers of respondents who said that they would or would not pay something 
for the legislation. It shows that although the majority (63.5%) say they would pay something, 
103 (15.5%) individuals reported that they were either definitely not or probably not prepared to 
pay. Of these, 58 subsequently went on to indicate a non-zero WTP amount when asked how 
much they would be willing to pay. This could reflect the WTP amounts presented to them, 
which started at £0.05 per week (0.6% increase on stated chicken expenditure). This may have 
induced a positive response from respondents who otherwise might have bid nothing. However, 
given this apparent inconsistency in stated preferences, for those respondents who had previously 
indicated that they would ‘definitely not’ or ‘probably not’ be willing to pay something for the 
legislation, a zero WTP is assumed in the estimation of WTP below to reduce any upward bias 
due to ‘yea saying’. 
 
Table 3: Numbers of respondents who would be prepared to pay something for the broiler 
legislation 
  Frequency Percent 




Possibly yes (2) 267 40.3 
Not sure (3) 139 20.9 
Probably Not (4) 77 11.6 
Definitely Not (5) 26 3.9 




Table 4 gives the interval regression results for both the Normal (in the bottom panel) and log-
Normal (in the top panel) models as described in Equations 1 and 2. Income, membership of an 
organisation concerned with the welfare of animals (labelled RSPCA) and having children under 
16 in the household all have a significant influence on WTP in both regressions. The regressors 
have been demeaned so that for the Normal model the intercept can be interpreted as the mean 
(and median since it is a symmetric distribution) estimate of WTP at the sample mean of the 
descriptors.  For the log-Normal model, the mean and median WTPs are calculated from the 
intercept and variance of the log-Normal regression, but may still be interpreted as estimates at 
the sample mean of the descriptors. The preferred model is the log-Normal, given that the 
distribution of WTP estimates (as averages of the intervals) are clearly of a log-Normal type. 
 
Table 4. Results from Normal and log-Normal interval regressions.a,b Dependent variable is 
WTP.  
 Estimate SD Est Pseudo-t     
Log_Normal        
Intercept 3.33 0.05 65.17**     
BTSI 0.08 0.10 0.86     
ln(Income) 0.29 0.08 3.58**                                                      
ln(Age) -0.01 0.14   -0.07     
Female 0.19 0.10  1.82*     
RSPCA 0.54 0.14 3.80**     
Have Children 0.29 0.13 2.14**     
Error Variance 1.65 0.10      
Median WTP 27.97 1.43      




        
Normal        
Intercept 56.43 3.07 18.34**     
BTSI 4.95 6.13 0.80     
ln(Income) 13.20 4.91 2.68**     
ln(Age) -0.71 8.50     -0.08     
Female 5.17 6.47 0.80     
RSPCA 30.51 8.55 3.56**     
Have Children 21.37 8.36 2.55**     
Error Variance 5782.59 372.53      
Mean and 
Median WTP 56.43 3.07      
     
     
     
a Asterisks * and ** denote 2-tailed significance at the 10% and 5% significance respectively. 
b Number of observations = 665 
 
WTP robustness checks 
In order to guard against ‘yea saying’, the models were re-estimated under the assumption that  
those respondents who had previously indicated that they would ‘definitely not’ or ‘probably 
not’ be willing to pay something for the legislation, had zero or even negative WTPs, even if 
they subsequently indicated otherwise. In addition, we corrected for bias which may have been 
caused by over-representation of some classes of socio-demographic stratification in the sample 
compared with the general population. We did this by inputting average key socio-demographic 
characteristics of the general population of England and Wales for 2014 (ONS, 2014a) into the 
preferred model and re-estimating WTP. These key characteristics are income (£27,200), age 
(40), gender (49.3% male), the proportion of households with children under 16 (30.3%) and an 
assumption that 5% of the general population were members of an organization concerned with 
the welfare of animals. 
 
The preferred log-Normal model with these adjustments gives an estimated mean WTP of £62.5 
and a median WTP of £21.5 per household per week. Differences between these values reflect 
the highly diffuse upper tail in the log-Normal distribution. Thus, the median estimate is 




associated with the legislation5. These values compare with those of around £64 and £28 
respectively of the unadjusted WTP estimates from the log-Normal model shown in Table 4. 
 
However, to explore the robustness of this conclusion further the log-Normal model was re-
estimated assigning a zero WTP to 148 respondents who answered ‘No’ when asked (prior to 
informing them about the legislation) if they would be willing to pay something to improve the 
welfare of meat chickens but then subsequently stated a positive WTP to support the broiler 
legislation. These results are not shown here but are very similar to the log-Normal model results 
shown in Table 4 except that median WTP was estimated at £14.3 per household per week.  
 
Impact of the BTSI 
Before returning to the results in Table 4, it is worth noting that the mean BTS scores for 
incentivised individuals relative to non-incentivised individuals were 0.17 and 0.13 respectively. 
While the incentivised group had higher scores on average, a t-test of the difference between 
group scores was not statistically significant (p-value > 0.15). With respect to the group of 
individuals with a positive WTP, the incentivised and non-incentivised groups represented 
69.5% and 71.2% of these respondents respectively. A z-test for differences in proportions was 
again statistically insignificant (p value > 0.30).  
 
Next we return to the results in Table 4 to test for the impact of the BTSI on WTPs. As before 
two forms of interval regression were used, i.e. Normal and log-Normal (see Table 4). The point 
here is not to make a comparison of the WTP results, but to show that inference is robust to 
assumptions about the nature of the WTP distributions. As these are Bayesian estimates, the 
"Pseudo-t" values are the ratio of the estimate divided by the standard deviation of the estimate, 
similar to the t-statistic in classical regression. If this statistic exceeds 1.96 then it is likely that 
the associated regressor is having a non-zero impact on the dependent variable. The BTSI 
dummy indicates whether individuals have been incentivised according to the BTSI.  
 
                                                          
5 Note that the very few in the sample (34 of 665) who did not eat chicken had an average WTP of around twice 




The coefficient of BTSI can be interpreted as the increase in WTP (directly for the Normal or 
logged WTP for the log-Normal case) resulting from the BTSI treatment. The coefficients are 
positive for both the Normal (4.95) and log-Normal (0.09) cases, but given their large standard 
deviations, these cannot be reliably said to have a positive impact on WTP. In addition to the 
regression results shown in Table 4, we performed a regression for each distribution with the 
BTSI dummy as the sole explanatory variable, in order to test that the lack of significance for 
BTSI is not due to collinearity of the BTSI dummy with other regressors. Again, the coefficents 
of BTSI were positive but not significant. From these results, it is evident that according to either 
distribution there is no statistically-significant evidence that the use of the BTSI has had an 
impact on WTP in this case.   
 
In summary, the results show that the responses of people with respect to the truth score itself, 
their WTP or the propensity to give inconsistent responses are largely invariant to the BTSI. 
 
6. Discussion  
Our survey results indicate that people in England and Wales generally support the broiler 
Directive legislation and appear to have a substantial WTP to support it. WTP was found to be 
positively correlated with income, level of concern about chicken welfare and belief that the 
legislation will improve the welfare of meat chickens, as would be expected. Moreover, a large 
majority of respondents stated that they understood both the information provided to them about 
the Directive and the WTP questions they were asked to respond to. Thus, the survey instrument 
appeared to work well and to result in credible responses from respondents. The sample size of 
665 respondents meets the requirement recommended by Mitchell and Carson (1989 p. 229) for a 
sample size of 600 usable responses or more for estimating benefits for policy purposes. 
 
However, there are many opportunities for various types of bias within stated preference survey 
instruments and there is a vast literature on such biases within stated preference research, 
including the issue of misreporting. In the first place, since the legislation already exists, fully 
informed and economically rational participants would not be expected to be willing to pay 
anything more for what they already have and are already paying for, one way or another. 




being removed (i.e. up to the point where their consumer surplus is zero). Harvey and Hubbard 
(2013) provide a critique of the elicitation of people’s WTP in relation to animal welfare together 
with a more general thought-provoking consideration of the application of economics to animal 
welfare. Emotive issues such as animal welfare are susceptible to social desirability bias, where 
respondents feel pressured to provide a socially desirable response (i.e. to show concern for the 
humane treatment of animals), which may have been provoked by some questions in our survey. 
We also acknowledge the possibility of starting point bias and/or range bias associated with the 
WTP values presented to participants (where they may feel that either the first amount or the 
range of amounts presented to them is some indication of the amount they should be willing to 
pay). In addition, ‘strategic bias’ may have been present, especially in relation to the scenario 
presented to respondents which described the legislation as being currently evaluated (which was 
true). Respondents may have felt that implementation of the legislation was under threat and may 
therefore have strategically over-stated their WTP to ensure that the legislation was 
implemented. We have used a relatively cautious approach to WTP estimation to guard against 
these potential biases. 
    
Otherwise, responses of individuals may be shaped (perhaps resulting in misreporting) by the way 
in which questions are presented (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), the information they are 
presented with (Ajzen et al., 1996; Hensher, 2006), hypothetical bias (the difference between true 
WTP and stated WTP) including the perceived social desirability associated with questions 
(Nederhof, 1985) such as humane treatment of chickens in this survey, the time they are given to 
complete the survey (Conte et al., 2016), the length of the survey (Savage and Waldman, 2008) 
and so on. It is not possible to test for all possible biases, priming or other effects of survey design. 
Our survey instrument was carefully designed, pre-tested and piloted to minimize bias in responses 
and the results analysed and presented to avoid estimation bias. Responses were scrutinised in 
relation to their credibility, rationality and consistency to identify potential issues that might cast 
doubt on the validity of the survey instrument design, people’s responses to the questions and the 
subsequent results. Questions regarding respondents’ consumption of chicken and their attitudes 
toward animal and chicken welfare were placed prior to information on the Directive and 




and the importance that they give to animal and chicken welfare (e.g. in relation to other concerns 
such as food safety and a healthy diet). 
 
Loomis (2014) identifies and reviews both ex ante and ex post strategies for overcoming 
hypothetical bias in stated preference surveys. The former includes ‘consequentiality designs’ 
which means that the survey has some potential effect on the utility of respondents such as higher 
prices or taxes. This approach was used in the survey reported here together with binary, 
dichotomous choice question formats and compulsory payment mechanisms as recommended by 
Loomis (see also Carson and Groves, 2007). ‘Honesty and realism’ approaches are also 
recommended such as the one used in this survey which involved a request to respondents to 
“consider your answers to questions carefully, answer honestly and take care to avoid mistakes”. 
In addition, the BTSI was used to further encourage truthful responses. To reduce the possibility 
of hypothetical bias respondents were also reminded of their budget constraints. Loomis suggests 
that social desirability bias and cognitive dissonance (where respondents gain utility by responding 
according to perceived social norms rather than their own personal values) are reduced by having 
multiple bid values (with small positive amounts) as used in this survey, and by making responses 
impersonal and anonymous (again as used in the internet survey of this study). In addition, asking 
respondents what they think others would pay is a way of potentially gauging over-statement of 
WTP due to social desirability bias (see Lusk and Norwood, 2009) – an approach also used in this 
study and used as an integral part of the BTS. Ex post methods to reduce hypothetical bias 
identified by Loomis include reporting median WTP to minimize the effect of implausibly high 
WTPs, recording respondent uncertainty in relation to their WTP responses and recoding of ‘Yes’ 
responses as ‘No’ where there is sufficient uncertainty regarding respondents having a true positive 
WTP, all of which were used in this study. It is also noted that using a private good (such as chicken 
meat in this study) reduces hypothetical bias. Loomis warns that there is no consensus regarding 
the best method to correct for hypothetical bias, that measuring hypothetical bias is difficult (the 
analyst needs to know the true WTP) and that it is possible to over-correct for this bias and so 
underestimate WTP. 
 
We estimate the median WTP as a measure of the consumer surplus associated with the broiler 




model, after correcting for bias, representing 5% of the total annual amount that respondents 
estimated they spent on chicken meat. Our more conservative estimate, assuming a zero WTP for 
those who said they would not be willing to pay more, despite subsequently providing a positive 
response, is £14.3 per household per week. 
 
According to the UK National Census (ONS, 2014a), there were 23.4 million households in 
England and Wales in 2011. Using the WTP estimate of £21.5/year from above, the aggregate 
amount that consumers in England and Wales would be willing to pay for the broiler Directive is 
£504 million/year. The more conservative estimate generates aggregate benefits of £333 million/ 
year. A 2014 survey of 119 commercial conventional broiler producers estimated the cost of 
compliance with the broiler Directive in England and Wales over the period 2010 to 2014 to be 
£108.4 million (current prices), an average of approximately £21.7 million per year or nearly £21.9 
million per year including government inspection and enforcement costs (Defra, 2017; Defra 
2010), implying a benefit-cost ratio of 23:1. The more conservative estimate gives a benefit-cost 
ratio of 15:1. Some radical changes in assumptions for both benefits and costs would be required 
to conclude that the costs of the legislation exceed the benefits.  
 
Prior to the introduction of the Directive, SAC Commercial Ltd (SAC, 2005) estimated that 
consumers in England and Wales would be willing to pay the equivalent of just under 
£20/household/year (2014 prices) which is similar to the estimate generated above.6 However, 
people’s perceptions of the value of the legislation may have been somewhat different before and 
after implementation of the legislation so the two estimates are not wholly comparable. 
 
With regard to the BTS, we found no statistically significant impact of the BTSI on responses to 
the survey. We believe this negative finding is at least as important as those studies which 
suggest that the BTS has an impact. While we would encourage further investigation of this 
approach, we believe that the literature should report cases where this technique has not 
demonstrably changed behaviour in addition to occasions when it has. Not to do so would lead to 
                                                          
6  The SAC estimate of £7.53/person/year. According to the National Census (ONS, 2014a), average household 
size in 2013 was 2.37 persons with 1.86 adults per household. Therefore, the SAC (2005) WTP estimate 





a biased representation of the weight of evidence in favour of positive BTS effects (more 
generally, for the importance of reporting negative findings we refer readers to the debate 
concerning ‘priming’ (Shanks et al. 2013)). 
 
There are a number of reasons why our study may have failed to observe a significant BTSI 
impact. First, while there may have been misreporting by the sample, the level or nature of the 
incentive may not have been sufficient to alter respondent behaviour. More specifically, the 
incentive provided for truth telling (the ‘prize draw’) may have been too small and uncertain, 
with respondents perceiving only a small chance of gaining financially for ‘truth telling’ (with an 
unknown probability of winning because respondents did not know the number of people taking 
part in the prize draw). Second, although most respondents had some level of belief in the truth 
score there was an element of disbelief which may have reduced the impact of the BTSI across 
the sample. Third, irrespective of the efficacy of the incentive, there may simply have been no 
significant misreporting in the sample and therefore no error to correct. This effect may be the 
case because the perceived gravity of the issue being investigated encourages truthful reporting. 
It is worth noting that some previous studies which have found the BTS to be effective asked 
respondents to report on what might be deemed more trivial matters, for example surveys of the 
extent of people’s recognition of world leaders’ names and film titles (see Weaver and Prelec, 
2013). Arguably, the more gravity that respondents attach to the issue under investigation, the 
more likely respondents are to carefully consider the questions presented to them, thus reducing 
one potential source of misreporting. Additionally, a number of aspects of the survey and 
questionnaire were designed to minimise bias and reduce any potential misreporting and this 
may have contributed to an absence of misreporting by respondents.  
 
7. Conclusion 
We find that people in England and Wales have a substantial stated WTP to support legislation to 
monitor and improve the welfare of broiler chickens in the UK. At a societal level, the benefits 
of the legislation, as measured by people’s estimated WTP, greatly outweighed the costs (as 
estimated by a survey of broiler producers). This suggests both that the current broiler legislation 
was worth implementing and that it is worth continuing in the UK.  Use of a Bayesian Truth 




significant difference in terms of people’s responses or their WTP. This finding suggests that 
further studies need to be undertaken to better determine the exact circumstances under which 
the use of the BTSI has most effect in reducing misreporting.  
 
Supporting Information 
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article: 
Appendix S1 Specimen copy of the online questionnaire 
Appendix S2 Specification of the Bayesian Truth Serum scoring formula 
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Appendix 2: BTS (Bayesian Truth Serum) scoring formula 
 
If question answers and predictions are denoted by 
 
      (1) and 
 
     (2) respectively, 
 
where xr are the answers of respondent, r to questions 1 to m and yr are the  predictions of 
respondent, r to questions 1 to m, then we can calculate the population endorsement frequencies, 
x̄k, and the (geometric) average, ȳk, of predicted frequencies as: 
 
    (3) 
 
    (4) 
 
where n is the sample size. Instead of applying a preset answer key, we evaluate answers 
according to their information score, which is the log-ratio of actual-to-predicted endorsement 
frequencies. The information score for answer k is 
 
       (5) 
 
The total score for a respondent combines the information score with a separate score for the 




   (6) 
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(Prelec, 2004). 
 
 
 
